Blue Collar,
I understand where you are coming from and the basis for your argument but the foundation is skewed. I'm not saying you are outright wrong but I truly disagree with your assessments.
The only reduction in risk is to to the operator of the sUAS. Everyone else is still at risk, at greater levels than with manned operations. That's why the DOT/FAA published the risk assessment figures used for the sUAS registration desires. sUAS ops COULD be safer, but the equipment isn't there yet. Roughly 48,000 people died in auto accidents last year, yet operation of an automobile is considered "safe". Cherry picking reference data does not present well to people that have comprehension of the larger picture. sUAS only appears "safer" at the moment because the use inside this country, and most others, for commercial operations is not yet wide spread. There is yet to be a data base generated that records sUAS incidents and injuries at all levels. Even RC aircraft have had their share of fatal and serious injuries, generally involving the operator of the model aircraft. That data is difficult to obtain but serious research will expose it. None of the major MR manufacturers will publish the numbers of reported flyaways and component failures they have received from their users, we have to use anecdotal evidence from forum posts to develop a reference. What is clear is those rates are higher than what is acceptable.
As one involved in the high end side of sUAS I oppose an increase in regulations beyond what is needed to provide for safe operation of our stuff. Anyone operating sUAS commercially should be certified at some level and understand safety and airspace. I do believe "tiered" regulations will be/are necessary for different classes of sUAS operation though. BLOS ops are vastly different from low level, line of sight operations, and different and considerably better equipment is necessary for such operations. Operator requirements need to be much higher for BLOS ops because they will be operating in the manned aircraft environment and must be fluent in how the system works to effectively participate in it. Using line of sight equipment I've consistently flown out over 130 miles with sUAS and know without any doubt we cannot maintain see and avoid with the equipment available to us now, and that the response of the operator during emergency situations is something that has to be ingrained into the operator, with other safety features integrated into the sUAS hardware/software. If comm and GPS are lost at the same time many sUAS are programmed to terminate continued flight in a self destructive manner. I've seen many hit the ground, both near and far, but the training and systems involved with them prevented injury to people on the ground. I've only got a bit over 2000 hours of PIC time with higher end commercial sUAS and many times that on the maintenance and R&D sides. At one time I was a full scale flight instructor. On the RC side of things I've been at it so long I stopped counting the hours many years ago, so I believe I have a basis of foundation for my positions.
Nobody can yet say that about multirotors since they are completely uncontrollable if the power fails, and still take off to places unknown by themselves with high frequency. Someone getting hit with a 15" to 32" carbon prop is not something I want to see. I've already seen what props of the same size do on humans with RC. Some of those occurred with RC aircraft under full control of an operator, some after positive control or radio link was lost, but the fact remains that in far too many of those instances someone got seriously hurt or killed.
There's also the one item that has yet to be addressed, and that's system comprehension of what people are using for their MR activities. The vast majority do not understand the relationships of the equipment being used, nor do they understand the programming of their flight controllers, and in many cases how to make safe alterations to that software when such options are available. Some manufacturers are loathe to provide detailed system information to their users. Those alone can be the difference between a safe and unsafe activity. Buy and fly does nothing for the promotion of safe flight practices. In fact, it does just the opposite.